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Work flow policies are shown to induce a change in average between-workers variability (worker
heterogeneity) and within-worker variability in performance times. In a laboratory experiment, the
authors measured the levels of worker heterogeneity and within-worker variability under an individual
performance condition, a work sharing condition, and a fixed assignment condition. The work sharing
policy increased the levels of worker heterogeneity and worker variability, whereas the fixed assignment
policy decreased them. These effects, along with work flow policy main effects on mean performance
times and variability are examined. This article represents an initial step in understanding effects that may
be important in the selection of an operating policy, the ignorance of which may lead to costly
misestimates of performance.

A flow line is a production line in which all work follows the
same sequence of operations. Because of the popularity and effi
ciency of the flow line, it has been the subject of considerable
research (for a review, see Gagnon & Ghosh 1991; Ghosh &
Gagnon, 1989). However, differences in worker ability and vari
ability have been virtually ignored in operational models of flow
lines, in spite of a wealth of psychological research evidence to
suggest that significant differences exist, even for simple manual
tasks (Doerr & Arreola-Risa, 2000; Hunter, Schmidt, & Judiesch,
1990; Rothe, 1978; Schmidt, Hunter, Outerbridge, & Goff, 1988).
Recently, however, a class of work sharing systems (WSSs) has
been proposed (Bartholdi & Eisenstein, 1996; Zavadlav, McClain,
& Thomas, 1996) that not only acknowledges worker differences
but (as we explain later in this article) relies on them as well. In
this article we examine the importance of between-workers vari
ability (differences in the mean performance of individual work
ers) and within-worker variability (differences in the performance
of a single worker over time) on two kinds of flow lines.
The issue of within-worker and between-workers variability is
important for a variety of reasons. First, for those doing work in

the design of flow lines, in this article we question one of the most
common assumptions of research on this topic: that within-line
variability is random (unbiased) noise. Typically, when investigat
ing a design change, one assumes that the only variability of
interest is due to the manipulation (between-line variability). Our
results show that at least some types of design changes affect
within-line variability as well. Second, this article represents a
preliminary investigation into the magnitude with which flow line
efficiency is impacted by within-worker and between-workers
variability and the degree to which this impact is moderated by
work flow policies. The existence of such variability, as noted
above, is not seriously in question (though few articles have
appeared that recognize it). It may be that the flow line design
literature has ignored within-worker and between-workers vari
ability because researchers believe it does not make any practical
difference. However, this question has not been studied, and this
article represents an initial step in the investigation of that issue.
Finally, with our comparison of two work flow policies, this article
contributes to improved managerial decision making by examining
new factors (heterogeneity and variability) that appear to affect
group performance under those policies. The potential implications
of research into these factors could be that management should not
attempt to select the “most efficient” policy (regardless of the
employees) or even the “fastest” employee (regardless of the work
flow policy) but should instead think of selecting the best policy
for a particular group or the best worker for an existing group and
policy. Of course, such prescriptions cannot be derived from a
single empirical study, but our work represents an initial investi
gation into these factors. Although it may seem overly mechanistic
to evaluate employees in terms of their individual variability, we
point out that such a procedure would be unquestioned if applied
to any other input to the production (or service) process: One of the

points of quality management is the control of variability in
methods and materials. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that
workers, as a major source of variability (Doerr & Arreola-Risa,
2000), might usefully be selected and managed with some atten
tion to variability as well.
In the next section, we examine two work flow policies in more
detail, to be able to hypothesize, in the Within-Worker and
Between-Workers Variability on Flow Lines section, the different
impact they will have on individual and group performance and
variability.

Work Flow Policies
In the context of a flow line, work flow describes the way work
moves between workers on the line. We use the term work flow
policy (WFP) to describe all of the methods management has
available to control work flow. These control methods all affect the
interactions between workers. The impact of these interactions on
the subsequent use of skills and motivational variables has been
largely ignored in the applied psychology and operations manage
ment literature.
We are testing a behavioral model in this article, and our
analysis was conducted by examining observable behaviors. How
ever, to understand and explain our results, we draw on relevant
literature from the field of industrial and organizational psychol
ogy. For example, we draw on findings of motivational effects
from studies of interdependence (Kiggundu, 1981; Thomas, 1957;
Thompson, 1967), social loafing (Comer, 1995; Latane, Williams,
& Harkins, 1979), social compensation (Plaks & Higgins, 2000;
K. D. Williams & Karau, 1991), autonomy (Klein, 1989; Langfred,
1999), feedback (Matsui, Kakuyama, & Onglatco, 1987), and
equity (Harder, 1992) to predict and explain our results.
We are interested in two different types of work flow policies.
With a fixed assignment system (FAS), the workload assigned to
each worker is a sequence of contiguous operations, fixed from
batch to batch. (A batch is a set of tasks to perform or a set of
products to process.) The workload is performed in a limited
physical zone, or workstation; the workstations typically do not
overlap, work cannot be preempted, and the coordination required
between workers at adjacent workstations is highly constrained. Of
course, in some cases, more than one worker may be assigned to
a workstation, but for simplicity we assume one worker per
workstation.
With a WSS, the workload assignment is allowed to change
from batch to batch (Zavadlav et al., 1996). The change of work
load requires one worker to preempt, or interrupt, the work of
another. An upstream worker must communicate the status of work
on the batch to the downstream worker, and the two workers must
coordinate the handoff of any required tooling or material needed
to work on the batch. Thus, WSS involves a type of worker
interaction and structural interdependence that does not exist with
an FAS. It has been shown that such systems can, under certain
conditions, outperform equally balanced lines and achieve a steady
state assignment in which faster workers are more heavily loaded
in proportion to their average individual performance (Bartholdi &
Eisenstein, 1996).
The FASs and WSSs can be related to the typologies of group
tasks given by Steiner (1972). The FAS is a kind of conjunctive
task in which the “group performance is determined by the least

able member” (Steiner, 1972, p. 17), whereas the WSS most
closely resembles an additive task in which the group performance
“depends upon the sum of the individual efforts” (Steiner, 1972, p.
17). The FAS is more complicated than the conjunctive tasks
studied by Steiner because our tasks are variable. The WSS is more
complicated than the additive tasks studied by Steiner because our
tasks are variable and our assignments, or matching, is dynamic.
Steiner (1972) claimed that for conjunctive tasks “the ideal ar
rangement in cases of this kind is one that involves as much
homogeneity as possible” (p. 112), whereas for additive (but not
dynamic) tasks, he claimed that heterogeneity was “irrelevant to
potential productivity” (p. 117). We show later in this article that
the existence of variability complicates the first claim, whereas the
existence of variability and dynamism makes the WSS so different
from a typical additive task that the second claim does not apply.
WSSs have a set of boundary rules that tell the workers, from
batch to batch, how to interact with the upstream and downstream
workers and where the assignments should begin and end in each
cycle. There are different rules that can be used. In the bucket
brigade rules most commonly used (and the ones we used in our
experiment), workers proceed toward the end of the line with their
current batch until they are preempted or, in the case of the last
worker on the line, until they finish the batch. If they catch up to
the worker ahead of them, they must wait (i.e., they are blocked).
Once the worker at the end of the line finishes the batch he or she
is working on, he or she walks back to the adjacent upstream
worker, preempts that person’s work and then proceeds forward
again with the new batch. Each worker in turn preempts the
adjacent upstream worker except the worker at the beginning of
the line, who begins a new batch.

Within-Worker and Between-Workers Variability on Flow
Lines
In spite of the well-established existence of substantial differ
ences between workers in performance (Doerr & Arreola-Risa,
2000; Doerr, Mitchell, Schriesheim, Freed, & Zhou, 2002; Dudley,
1968; Hunter et al., 1990; Knott & Sury, 1987) the FAS literature
has typically ignored the impact of differences in worker ability. In
1989, a comprehensive literature review of over 150 articles
(Ghosh & Gagnon, 1989) found no research that incorporated
worker differences in ability, possibly because the focus was on
establishing line balances in spite of such differences so that
workers could more easily be interchanged or replaced (Parker &
Wall, 1998).
In contrast, the dynamics of the workload assignment depend on
differences in average individual performance with WSS; faster
workers are required to do more work. Under WSS, workers
should be ordered from slowest to fastest for maximum efficiency
(Bartholdi & Eisenstein, 1996; Bartholdi, Eisenstein, & Foley,
2001). Thus, WSS both assumes and depends on differences in
average individual performance in ways that an FAS does not.
FAS models assume that workers on a line are identical and that
any variability is endemic to the tasks rather than to the workers
(Doerr, Klastorin, & Magazine, 2000). WSS models, however,
assume that workers on the line are significantly different from
each other, but that within-worker variability is so insignificant
that it can be ignored.

Although there is a considerable body of evidence that substan
tial differences between workers exist in terms of performance
(Dunnette, 1983; Rothe, 1978; Schmidt & Hunter, 1983), the
stability of these differences is still an open question. It seems that
worker performance is dynamic: Workers’ performance relative to
each other on a given performance criterion may change over time
(the dynamic criterion problem; Austin & Villanova, 1992; Ployhart & Hakel, 1998). Moreover, even at a given point in time,
substantial within-worker variability in performance times has
been shown to exist (Doerr et al., 2002; Knott & Sury, 1987).
It can be shown that a line operating with a WSS policy should
be more efficient (in terms of the time required to complete work)
than a line operating with an FAS policy and balanced workloads
(Doerr et al., 2002). However, the dominance of the WSS policy
relies on the existence of stable (constant) worker differences in
performance. Without stable worker differences, the performance
of a WSS may degrade and become chaotic because upstream
workers will become blocked by downstream workers in unpre
dictable times and places. Although there is anecdotal evidence to
suggest that a WSS can perform well even under certain kinds of
variability (Bartholdi et al., 2001), to our knowledge there has been
no systematic experimental work done to test the impact of withinworker variability on the performance of a WSS.
Given the sort of dynamic relative performance predicted by
studies of the criterion problem (Austin & Villanova, 1992; Hof
mann, Jacobs, & Baratta, 1993; Hofmann, Jacobs, & Gerras, 1992;
Ployhart & Hakel, 1998), an ordering of workers from slowest to
fastest is problematic over time unless the ordering is reassessed at
regular intervals. Moreover, given substantial within-worker vari
ability (Doerr & Arreola-Risa, 2000), the order may be established
only for average case performance: The ordering may not hold at
any particular point in time, because a “slow” worker may be faster
than a “fast” worker on any particular cycle. Thus, under such
conditions a WSS line may be less efficient than an FAS line.
The clarity of the task assignment under a WSS is less clear,
because the assignment changes slightly from cycle to cycle. A
lack of clarity in task assignments is likely to lead to a lack of
visibility and accountability for performance and encourage social
loafing (Latane et al., 1979). This assignment clarity is also related
to the construct of dynamic task complexity defined by Wood
(1986), in that assignment clarity involves changes over time in the
acts required to accomplish a task. Wood, Locke, and Mento
(1987) argued that this construct will interact with motivation to
influence performance. This variability in assignment may create
an increased cognitive load that detracts attention from the work
rate or work quality (i.e., the workers have to think more about
which tasks to do and consequently think less about how fast or
how well they do each task). The coordination needed to accom
plish each cycle’s assignment is also less predictable under a WSS.
Assignment clarity is thus an additional factor that should favor an
FAS over a WSS.
Mathematical models of WSS performance ignore these behav
ioral impacts of assignment variability, and they assume constant
worker differences and no within-worker variability (e.g., Bar
tholdi & Eisenstein, 1996). Thus, predictions that a WSS is more
efficient than an FAS, drawn from these models, may not be
realized when the policy is implemented with human workers
(Doerr et al., 2002).

Hypothesis 1: The average group performance of WSS will
be no better than performance of an FAS.
In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that the theoretical dominance of
WSSs over FASs (Doerr et al., 2002) would not be observed
empirically. At the same time, we proposed that these policies
themselves would change the level of within-worker and betweenworkers variability observed on a flow line. We proposed that this
change would be affected at least in part by a motivational re
sponse to the policies that differs depending on the relative per
formance of the individual.
The idea that the context of a task might produce a motivational
response is not new (Mitchell, 1997; Mowday & Sutton, 1993).
We have already mentioned the social loafing literature, which
suggests that some workers will shirk in contexts in which their
performance is less directly observed. Other contexts may encour
age workers to slow down or speed up, depending on the workers’
relative ability. For example, work on social compensation (Plaks
& Higgins, 2000; K. D. Williams & Karau, 1991) suggests that
when employees are engaged in meaningful work, faster employ
ees will speed up if they are aware of their relative ability; the
more important or meaningful a task, the greater the effect.
The idea that WFPs can produce a motivational response that
depends on the relative performance of the employees is also not
new. The Koehler effect is the tendency for heterogeneous groups
to perform better than would be expected from their individual
performances (Hertel, Kerr, & Messé, 2000). Hertel et al. (2000)
found that the Koehler effect may occur on conjunctive tasks
(similar to FASs) but not additive tasks (similar to WSSs).
In the sort of serial interdependence workers on a flow line
experience (Thompson, 1967), each worker depends on the previ
ous, upstream worker, but in the FAS policy we examined, all
workers depend on the slowest, or bottleneck worker to set the
pace—no one can work faster than the bottleneck pace in the long
run. Whereas, in the WSS policy, the fastest worker sets the pace,
and his or her pace determines when the line resets; thus, other
workers are dependent on the fastest worker to determine their
assignment boundaries on each cycle.
One of the specific motivational factors that is thought to come
into play when one worker is depended upon by others is felt
responsibility. Felt responsibility is a motivational force that grows
out of expectations that one person should act to maximally
facilitate and minimally hinder another (Thomas, 1957). To cap
ture sources of felt responsibility, Kiggundu (1978, 1981, 1983)
defined a variable called initiated interdependence, which mea
sures the degree to which one employee feels that others rely upon
him or her to accomplish their work. To the extent that initiated
interdependence produces a sense of felt responsibility in an em
ployee (because, for example, a downstream employee is waiting
for him or her to pass along work), it should yield an improvement
in performance.
Initiated interdependence describes only one half of a dyadic
relationship. To describe the other half, Kiggundu (1978, 1981,
1983) defined a variable called received interdependence, which is
felt by one employee when he or she depends upon another to
accomplish his or her work. Kiggundu (1978, 1983) did not find
the positive motivational impact for received interdependence that
was found for initiated interdependence. In fact, to the extent that
received interdependence is associated with reduced autonomy, it

is likely to have a generally negative motivational impact (Klein,
1989). Depending on their relative performance and the WFP in
place, employees on a flow line may experience either primarily
initiated or primarily received interdependence.
Prior to our experiment, we believed the following would be
true: On the static FAS line, the faster employees will experience
the most interruption of work by a peer, through the blocking
(waiting to pass work or move downstream) and starving (waiting
for work from upstream) caused by adjacent employees. Con
versely, on a dynamic WSS line, slower employees will experience
the most interruptions relative to the amount of work accom
plished. Thus, the fastest employee on the static FAS line and the
slowest one on a WSS line are most likely to experience negative
motivational states because of the control of their work pace by
another employee. Because this is likely to be perceived as a loss
of autonomy, it should be detrimental to performance (Klein,
1989; Langfred, 1999).
In comparison, the slowest employee on a static line will expe
rience the most responsibility for others because he or she is the
most frequent cause of starving or blocking another employee.
This experience will be shared by the fastest employee on a WSS
line because he or she controls the end of every cycle, and the
whole line resets according to his or her pace. Consequently, these
employees will be most likely to experience positive motivation
because they have to provide work to others and maintain the work
flow. Because this is likely to be perceived as increased pressure
to perform, the effect will be a positive motivational impact
(Kiggundu, 1983; Stewart & Barrick, 2000; Wong & Campion,
1991).
In particular, because the slowest worker on an FAS line will be
the bottleneck, he or she should experience something like initiated
interdependence and feel the greatest amount of pressure to in
crease his or her work rate. Schultz, Juran, and Boudreau (1998)
observed that bottleneck workers increased their work rate when
interstation buffers were reduced (thus increasing the likelihood
that they would cause starvation and blocking of adjacent work
ers). However, the slowest worker is not a bottleneck on the WSS
line; this worker should experience something like received inter
dependence. His or her work will merely be preempted by an
adjacent worker as needed to keep that worker busy. Moreover, the
constant preemption may be perceived as negative feedback by the
slowest worker, who will not experience any autonomy or control
over the work pace of the group.
Hypothesis 2A: The slowest worker will perform more
quickly on an FAS line than on a WSS line.
Because the fastest worker on the FAS line will experience the
most idle time due to starvation and blocking, he or she is likely to
experience less autonomy and control over work methods. Because
his or her pace will be determined by the slowest worker, he or she
should experience something like received interdependence. The
attention of the fastest worker may be distracted more frequently
because of increased idle time. Attention, and especially the focus
and direction of attention, is considered to be a primary motiva
tional process and has been shown to be related to the amount of
effort exerted on a task (Mitchell, 1997). Thus, the fastest worker
may be expected to slow down on an FAS. However, the fastest
worker has much more autonomy and control on a WSS line. His

or her work will never be preempted by an adjacent worker, and he
or she will never be blocked or starved. The fact that other workers
depend on the fastest worker to set their pace should cause them to
experience something like initiated interdependence. The potential
to control and maintain a steady work pace is likely to be a positive
motivational force.
Hypothesis 2B: The fastest worker on a flow line will perform
faster on a WSS than on an FAS.
Hypotheses 1, 2A, and 2B deal with mean performance. Hy
pothesis 1 postulates an observable effect in relative mean line
performance between WFPs based on considerations of withinworker and between-workers variability and assignment clarity.
Hypotheses 2A and 2B postulate that work flow policies will
induce an observable effect in mean individual performance, de
pending on the relative abilities of the employees.
Hypotheses 2A and 2B also imply something about the level of
between-workers differences, or heterogeneity, one would expect
to see on a line. Under an FAS, Hypotheses 2A and 2B predict that
faster workers will slow down, whereas slower workers will speed
up: a regression to the mean or a decrease in heterogeneity of
performances. Under WSS, Hypotheses 2A and 2B predict that
faster workers will speed up and slower workers will become even
slower: an increase in heterogeneity. Thus, Hypothesis 2C is
corollary to Hypotheses 2A and 2B.
Hypothesis 2C: Between-workers variability in performance
will be greater under a WSS than under an FAS.
Thus, Hypotheses 1 and 2 (A, B, and C) predict a multiphase
relationship in which preexisting differences in worker ability and
variability produce differences in the relative effectiveness of work
flow polices, and work flow policies act to moderate this effect by
reducing heterogeneity in FAS lines but increasing it on WSS
lines.
We next turn to an examination of within-worker variability.
The existence of substantial and systematic within-worker vari
ability over time is well documented (Deadrick & Madigan, 1990;
Hofmann et al., 1992; Rothe, 1978). Moreover, individuals appear
to have systematic differences in within-worker variability that can
be predicted in field settings (Deadrick & Gardner, 1997; Hofmann
et al., 1993; Ployhart & Hakel, 1998). This within-worker vari
ability has been measured not only in longitudinal studies of shifts
of mean performance but also in examinations of systematic dif
ferences between workers in within-worker work-rate distributions
over short time frames, for example, during the course of an
experiment (Doerr & Arreola-Risa, 2000; Knott & Sury, 1987).
Thus individual variability is important not only because it exists
but rather because it is both systematic and different across
individuals.
Although variability is recognized as an important topic in the
design of production flow lines, within-worker variability has been
virtually ignored in the operations management literature. The
source of variability in task times is almost always assumed, at
least implicitly, to be the tasks themselves and not the workers
(Doerr & Arreola-Risa, 2000). Thus, models that deal with vari
ability in the design of production flow lines (e.g., Bartholdi et al.,
2001; Carraway, 1989) cannot be used to address questions about

the impact that differences between workers in within-worker
variability have on flow line performance, because they implicitly
assume that workers are interchangeable and that particular work
ers do not affect the variability that (in those models) is inherent in
the tasks themselves.
We proposed that within-worker variability will be affected by
work flow policies, because different policies will produce more or
less clarity and simplicity in the work flow. In discussing Hypoth
esis 1, we noted the ways that variability in work assignment may
reduce group performance in WSS. Here, we note that variability
in work assignment may also induce variability in individual
performance.
Moreover, compared with an FAS, WSS involves more coordi
nation between workers because they must preempt one another
and communicate about the status of the work that they are passing
along. WSS also potentially involves a greater range of activities
and more physical movement along the line than an FAS. These
factors will combine to affect the variability of individual work
times because (apart from any difference in mean performance
due, e.g., to the coordination, preemption, and movement time)
they will create intermittent distractions in the work flow and
require a dispersion of effort and attention. Hence,
Hypothesis 3: Within-worker variability will be greater on a
WSS line than on an FAS line.
In Hypothesis 2C we predicted changes in between-workers
variability in performance across different policies. In Hypothesis
3 we predicted changes in within-worker variability in perfor
mance across different policies. In the next section, we describe an
experiment conducted to investigate these three hypotheses.

Method
Participants consisted of 105 undergraduate students enrolled in an
introductory operations management class at a private university in the
southeastern United States. Participation in this experiment could be used
to partly satisfy a research requirement for the course, but other activities
could satisfy that requirement as well. No coercion was applied to garner
student participation, and the investigators did not recruit from their own
classes. Participation from classes in which students were recruited aver
aged 84%. Neither the age, gender, nor ethnicity of the participants was
tracked, but participants were diverse in gender and ethnicity and repre
sented a cross-section of the undergraduate population and were not
noticeably different from the general student population.
The experiment consisted of a behavioral simulation of an order-picking
operation. Totes (approximately 10 in. [25.4 cm] X 6 in. [15.24 cm] X 0.5
in. [1.27 cm]) of Halloween toys were arranged in five racks, with 9 totes
to a rack (see Figure 1). Totes were placed three to a column on a table so
that once a participant was standing in front of a column of 3 totes, every
tote in the column was within easy arms reach for every participant. A rack
thus consisted of three contiguous columns of 3 totes each. The face of
each rack was 30 in. (76.20 cm) across. The first and fifth racks were
separated from the second and fourth racks, respectively, by a distance of
20 in. (50.80 cm), whereas the second, third, and fourth racks were
separated from each other by a distance of 10 in. (25.40 cm). Therefore, the
total length of the line was 210 in. (533.40 cm) and an even division into
three stations would have five columns (15 totes) distributed across 70 in.
(177.80 cm).
Manipulations consisted of an individual-work condition (IWC), an FAS
condition, and a WSS condition. During every condition, one investigator
stood on the left side of the racks (the beginning of the line) and gave

Figure 1.

The order-picking racks.

participants an order form and a bag to be filled according to the order
form. A second investigator stood on the right side of the racks and
collected the order form and filled bag. A third investigator stood across a
table from the second, and participants were told that this investigator was
in charge of quality control and would be verifying their work. Participants
were told to work as quickly as possible without making errors. During the
experiment, participants filled a total (across all conditions) of 90 customer
orders (30 in each condition), with each order consisting of requests for
various items from each of the totes. The orders were balanced so that the
same number of requests came from each column of 3 totes.
During the IWC, there were 10 trials in which participants were given a
bag and a customer order listing 15 items to be placed in the bag. The items
on the customer orders were printed according to their physical sequence
on the line so that a participant could start filling the bag at one end of the
line and proceed down the line to the end filling the bag along the way.
When the participant reached the end of the line, he or she gave the filled
bag to a second investigator and returned to the beginning of the line. To
avoid a confound with learning effects, we used only the average times
from the last three bags to compute individual work rates and variability.
Although significant learning seemed to take place as the initial two to
three bags were filled, a paired t test comparing the mean time each
participant required to fill each of the last three bags (M = 42.37 s, a =
5.54) with the mean time that same participant required to fill the previous
bag (M = 42.86 s, a = 6.48) revealed no significant difference, t(104) =
1.12, p > .05, indicating that any remaining learning was insignificant
when participants filled the last three bags.
For the FAS and WSS conditions, participants were grouped randomly
into teams of 3, and those teams were used for both conditions. In both
conditions, participants were assigned to positions on the line in ascending
order of the work rates calculated from the individual condition so that the
slowest participant was at the beginning of the line and the fastest partic
ipant was at the end of the line. These relative work rates, assessed during
the experiment with stopwatch observations, were later verified by the use
of videotape observations. In no case was an inappropriate assignment
made (e.g., in no case was a participant who performed more slowly during
the individual condition inadvertently “promoted” to an advanced position
on the line). Thirty orders were filled in both conditions, but only obser
vations from 24 orders (5–28) were used to compute individual and group
work rates. (The first 4 orders were discarded to control for possible

learning effects, and the last 2 orders were discarded because the partici
pants may have become aware that the condition was ending and thus
worked at a different pace.) To test for order effects between the FAS and
WSS conditions, we designed the experiment so that half of the participants
went from an individual work to an FAS condition and then to a WSS
condition, whereas the rest went from an IWC to a WSS condition and then
an FAS condition. All dependent variables were tested for significant order
effects using paired t tests, but no significant order effects were found, so
we collapsed the cells for analysis.
During the FAS condition, participants were assigned columns of totes
so that each participant had five columns of totes to pick from, distributed
across an equal physical space of 70 in. (177.80 cm; see Figure 1). A
customer order would be given to the first participant, who would pick five
items and then hand the order along with the partially filled bag to the next
participant. (For the first orders, the last 2 participants were given partially
filled bags and told to continue the order as if the upstream worker had just
handed the order to them.) Participants were not allowed to build intersta
tion buffers but instead had to (a) wait (become blocked) if the downstream
participant was not ready to receive an order and (b) wait (become starved)
if an upstream participant was not ready to pass an order down.
During the WSS condition, 3 participants were again assigned to the line
to fill customer orders. Participants were again arranged from slowest to
fastest on the line. This time, however, participants followed the bucket
brigade rules (outlined above) to fill the orders. Starting positions for the
first orders were determined by computing the number of columns each
participant should cover on average at a steady state, ni, then positioning
the participants from slowest to fastest so that ni columns were between
them. The number of columns was determined as follows:
1
i

ni

1

15

i
i

where i is the velocity of the ith participant and [a] is the nearest integer
to a. This procedure places participants in the starting position that is the
closest to the steady state starting positions they would gravitate toward
over a long period of time (Bartholdi & Eisenstein, 1996). These steadystate starting positions should be optimal, in the sense that they eliminate
starving and blocking in a system without within-worker variability (Doerr
et al., 2002). Proponents of a WSS would prescribe this as an initial starting
position if it could be implemented in advance, because it would reduce the
amount of inefficiency (relative to some other starting position) incurred in
the transition state. In other words, we were starting the workers where
they were supposed to wind up starting after a large number of cycles.
Starting them at that point reduces potential inefficiencies that may occur
in getting from an arbitrary starting point to this prescribed starting point.
Thus, this prescribed point should be the starting position that most favors
the WSS system. Because one of the points of our article is to question the
efficiency of the WSS system, this is a conservative procedure.

Measures
Data were collected on videotape by placing a camera approximately 20
ft (about 6.09 m) in front of the simulated pick area. The camera was
started before the first experimental condition began and allowed to run
throughout data collection. We coded data coded from the videotape by
using a stopwatch to measure performance times. Although these stop
watch measures of performance were subject to some potential coding
error, test–retest reliability (r = .90) was deemed acceptable.
Group performance was measured by observing the time required for an
order to travel from the beginning to the end of the line (flow time). Note
that the group performance measure includes idle time due to starvation
and blocking, but the individual performance measure does not. For the
IWC, group performance was defined as the average flow time of the 3
participants in the group used for the WSS and FAS conditions. Group

heterogeneity was measured by taking the standard deviation of the mean
individual performance times for the group.
Individual performance was measured by observing the time an individ
ual required to fill his or her portion of an order from the moment he or she
received the order and bag (either from the investigator at the beginning of
the line or from an upstream participant) until the moment the participant
was ready to release the order and bag (either to the investigator at the end
of the line or to a downstream participant). The performance time was
converted to a time per pick by dividing the time used by the number of
picks (15 in the individual condition, 5 in the FAS condition, and a variable
number in the WSS condition). Thus, individual performance does not
include idle time due to starvation, blocking, or coordination, nor is it
directly impacted by the fact that a varying number of picks might be
required under different policies.
Because we did not collect measures of ability apart from individual
performance in the IWC, we wanted to further assess the reliability of this
measure. Although it is one of the points of our hypotheses that individual
performance will be affected by work flow policy, we also expected to see
some stability in this measure across policies. To test this, we correlated
individual performance means across policies. The correlation between
individual performance means in the IWC and FAS individual performance
means was moderate but significant (r = .68, p < .01). Likewise, the
correlation between individual performance means in the IWC and WSS
individual performance means was moderate but significant (r = .54, p <
.01). Although not large, the difference between these two correlations was
significant (Fisher’s z = 2.27, p = .01)
A couple of observations are worth making about these correlation
results. First, they establish the point that there is some stability in our
individual performance measure but that individual performance is also
determined by work flow policy. If one considers individual performance
in the individual work condition as a surrogate for an ability measure, these
correlations can also be seen as an estimate of the predictability of indi
vidual performance under a WSS or an FAS policy, from ability measures.
Second, because one of the justifications of the WSS policy is that it
should allow workers to proceed at their own pace, it is somewhat coun
terintuitive that FAS individual performance means would correlate more
strongly with individual performance means under the IWC. As explored
further below, we believe this is mostly caused by a line position effect in
the WSS policy. To check this, we recalculated the correlations controlling
for line position effects, and the difference between the two policies
disappeared (the IWC–FAS correlation dropped to .67 and the IWC–WSS
correlation rose to .62). Thus, it appears that under both policies, individual
performance is somewhat predictable from individual performance under
the IWC, but the WSS policy has a line position effect that attenuates the
relationship.
Finally, within-worker variability was measured with a coefficient of
variation (CV) for each participant. This was computed by dividing the
standard deviation of individual performance times by the mean individual
performance time.
One might argue that faster workers would tend to be less variable ones
and hence cause correlation between our two individual performance
measures. The existence of such correlation would not be especially
problematic, because we have no hypotheses that relate these two perfor
mance measures (i.e., we have no hypotheses about the relationship be
tween heterogeneity and variability); however, this correlation is worth
examining, both because it deals with the divergent validity of our indi
vidual performance measures and because the relationship is interesting in
its own right. To test this, we correlated individual performance means
with individual performance standard deviations under each of the three
policies. As expected, faster workers were somewhat less variable under
the IWC (r = .43, p < .00). Controlling for line position, this relationship
is even stronger under the WSS (r = .65, p < .00) but weaker under the
FAS policy (r = .22, p = .02), and the difference was significant (Fisher’s
z = 5.57, p < .01). This is not surprising, because (as we show below) the

WSS policy induces variability in slower workers, whereas the FAS policy
induces variability in faster workers. The size of the difference in corre
lation between the FAS and WSS policy is somewhat surprising, however.

Table 2
Individual Task Times
Line position

Analyses

Beginning

To test for differences in group performance and heterogeneity by
condition, we used a paired t test to compare the WSS and FAS conditions.
We also conducted a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test for
differences among the WSS condition, FAS condition, and IWC, with a
Sheffé test to make post hoc pairwise comparisons between the three
conditions. Note that our test of Hypothesis 1 requires that we accept that
there is no difference between the means—that is, we need to accept the
null hypothesis. The problems with doing this with the tools of traditional
hypothesis testing are well known (Harcum, 1990; Malgady, 1998; Weitz
man, 1984 ), and we will not add to this debate. Rather, we present our
results, including an effect size and overlap (Cohen, 1988) and claim
support for our hypothesis to the extent that the effect size is trivial and the
distributions overlap.
To test for the interactive effects of line position and policy condition on
individual performance times and variability, we used a general linear
model (GLM; Cohen & Cohen, 1984). To test for differences between
individual line positions and policies, we used a cell means test (Toothaker,
1993). This procedure involves a t test for significant difference between
specific cell means of interest and is more informative than a simple test for
interaction or a Sheffé test for differences within levels of a single factor.
Critical values for the t tests were derived using a procedure developed by
Cicchetti (1972).

Results
Results for group performance are shown in Table 1. As can be
seen there, the flow times for the two policies are almost identical.
A one-tailed t test, paired t(34) = .68, p = .50, shows a small,
nonsignificant difference (effect size d = .13) and a large degree
of overlap (U = .098, indicating that the two distributions overlap
by over 90%; Cohen, 1988). This provides support for Hypothesis
1. The lack of a practical or significant difference is surprising in
light of the normative models that predict that the WSS will be
more efficient than the FAS (Doerr et al., 2002). We also con
ducted an ANOVA to test for differences among all three work
conditions and found that the work flow policies did not improve
flow time above the average flow time observed for the members
of the group under the individual work condition, F(2, 102) =
.348, p = .707, 12 = .063 (Sheffé tests also indicated that there
were no significant differences between any pair of the three
policies.)
Results for individual performance are shown in Table 2. A
GLM F(8, 306) = 20.356, p < .00, 12 = .418, indicated signif
icant policy effects, F(2, 306) = 23.762, p < .00, 12 = .280,
Table 1
Flow Time

Middle

End

Policy

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

WSS
FAS
IND

3.31
2.91
3.27

0.55
0.38
0.40

3.52
2.83
2.89

0.71
0.41
0.35

2.71
2.57
2.61

0.38
0.32
0.29

Note. Means and standard deviations are shown in seconds per pick. Each
policy group contained 105 participants. WSS = work sharing system;
FAS = fixed assignment system; IND = individual work.

significant line position effects, F(2, 306) = 44.917, p < .00, 12 =
.348, and a significant interaction, F(4, 306) = 6.372, p < .00,
12 = .221. As can be seen in Table 2, the slowest worker (at the
beginning of the line) was faster under an FAS than under a WSS,
and a cell means test indicated that the difference was significant
at = .05, t(3, 60) = 3.809 > 2.404. This provides strong support
for Hypothesis 2A. However, contrary to Hypothesis 2B, the faster
worker (at the end of the line) was also faster under an FAS policy.
Thus, Hypothesis 2B received no support. In fact, all workers were
faster under the FAS policy. This may seem surprising given the
results of the analysis of Hypothesis 1, but the explanation is quite
simple: The WSS policy, as expected, reduced idle time associated
with starvation and blocking. That is, the workers on the FAS line,
while actually filling orders, were faster than the workers on the
WSS line, but the groups’ overall performance was no better
because of the idle time on the FAS.
Results for group heterogeneity are shown in Table 3. Compared
with the individual condition, worker performance was more ho
mogenous under an FAS and more heterogeneous under a WSS.
An ANOVA indicated that the differences among the three poli
cies were significant, F(2, 102) = 14.460, p < .00, 12 = .344, and
a Sheffé test indicated that performance under the WSS policy was
significantly more heterogeneous than performance under the FAS
policy, t = 5.275, p < .00. Thus Hypothesis 2C received strong
support.
Results for individual variability are shown in Table 4. Withinsubject variability was higher under a WSS than under an FAS. It
is interesting to note that the average CV under the individual
policy (0.187) was higher than the average CV under an FAS
(0.140) but lower than the average CV under WSS (0.296). A
GLM, F(8, 306) = 15.667, p < .00, 12 = .388) indicated that the
differences between policies were significant, F(2, 306) = 44.60,
p < .00, 12 = .349, and a Sheffé test showed that the pairwise
Table 3
Standard Deviation of Each Group’s Average Seconds per Pick

Policy

M

SD

WSS
FAS
IND

44.09
44.86
44.26

4.81
6.58
5.31

Note. Means and standard deviations are shown in seconds per order.
Each policy group contained 35 participants. WSS = work sharing system;
FAS = fixed assignment system; IND = individual work.

Policy

SD

WSS
FAS
IND

0.552
0.257
0.352

Note. Each policy group contained 35 participants. WSS = work sharing
system; FAS = fixed assignment system; IND = individual work.

Table 4
Coefficients of Variation
Line position
Policy

Beginning

Middle

End

WSS
FAS
IND

0.260
0.129
0.196

0.396
0.152
0.190

0.231
0.138
0.175

Note. Coefficients of variation are shown in seconds per pick. Each
policy group contained 35 participants. WSS = work sharing system;
FAS = fixed assignment system; IND = individual work.

difference between the WSS and the FAS policies was also sig
nificant, t = 9.21, p < .00. These results provide limited support
for Hypothesis 3. However, the GLM also showed that there was
a significant main effect for line position, F(2, 306) = 7.896, p <
.00, 12 = .184, and a significant interaction between line position
and policy, F(4, 306) = 5.070, p < .00, 12 = .203. This significant
interaction makes a simple interpretation of the main effect of
work flow policy problematic, because it suggests that the rela
tionship is not as straightforward as suggested by Hypothesis 3.
Starting with the slowest worker, the CVs observed in the indi
vidual work condition were .196, .190, and .175. Thus, whereas
there is a slight tendency for faster workers to also be less variable,
the difference between participants was small. As already noted,
the CVs observed for the line positions under the FAS policy were
somewhat smaller (0.129, 0.152, and 0.138), but the middle-of
the-line position now shows the most variability, whereas the
beginning-of-the-line position shows the least. Under the WSS
policy, the CVs were all larger than those observed under the other
two conditions (0.260, 0.396, and 0.233), but the end-of-the-line
position exhibited the least variability. Thus, although it appears
that the WSS policy does induce variability in individual work
rates, the effect is much stronger for the middle-of-the-line posi
tion. Conversely, whereas it appears that the FAS policy reduces
variability in individual work rates, the effect is somewhat weaker
for the middle-of-the-line position.

Discussion
The primary implication of the analysis supporting Hypothesis 1
is that the relative efficacy of a WFP is significantly affected by
behavioral factors. Theoretical and mathematical models show that
WSS policy should dominate an FAS policy. However, these
models assume stationary work rates from individuals that are
unaffected by the WFP and continuous work flow unaffected by
the need to coordinate the boundaries of work assignments. Our
findings did not show that the WSS policy dominates the FAS
policy, but the findings should not be interpreted as showing that
the two are identical and certainly not that the FAS is better. Still,
the failure to find the dominance predicted by the mathematical
models is itself interesting as a counterexample to those models,
and it demonstrates the need to include worker effects in models of
WFP performance.
The result that the two policies may not be significantly differ
ent is practically important for at least two reasons. First, compa
nies spend money to implement WSSs because they think it will

improve productivity. Our findings suggest that this expense may
be inappropriate. Second, WSSs will evidently increase betweenworkers differences in performance. The result of this will be
either to increase differences in pay (if individual performance is
a significant component of pay) or to increase inequity (if indi
vidual performance is not a significant component of pay). Either
outcome is likely to have negative consequences (Cobb & Frey,
1996; Harder 1992; S. Williams, 1999).
The primary implication of the results supporting Hypothesis
2A is that line position effects are also significant determinants of
individual and group work rates and that these effects are also
dependent on the type of WFP in place. Although these line
position effects are similar to the effects first investigated analyt
ically by Hillier and Boling (1966), ours is the first article we know
of that shows line position effects on individual performance.
Contrary to Hypothesis 2, we found that the effect of the WSS
policy was not to increase the speed of the fastest worker and
decrease the speed of the slowest but rather to decrease every
worker’s speed, most notably the middle worker. There are at least
four potential explanations for the policy main effect that individ
ual performance is decreased under a WSS but increased under an
FAS. The first is an effect due to assignment clarity. The increased
cognitive load associated with maintaining a dynamic boundary
may reduce individual performance for all workers on the WSS
line. Another explanation is rooted in the way that feedback on
relative performance is received by the workers under the two
policies. Feedback is generally motivational, and feedback on
relative performance may be especially so (Matsui et al. 1987).
Under the FAS it is obvious on every cycle who is fastest, because
that person finishes before the adjacent worker and has to wait.
This feedback is likely to create a motivational force that is not felt
under the WSS, in which feedback on the relative speed is not as
clear from cycle to cycle. Related to this is a social loafing (Latane
et al., 1979) explanation: Workers under a WSS are slower be
cause their individual contributions are less obvious. Still another
possibility has to do with the perceived equity of the system. The
rewards for participation were the same for all participants: satis
fying a course requirement. But it may have become clear to the
participants that faster work on the WSS line would translate into
a heavier workload. Such perceived inequity is likely to be demo
tivational (Harder, 1992).
A possible explanation for the significant decrease in the per
formance of the middle worker under the WSS may be that the
boundaries between workers exert a greater cognitive load under
the WSS. For the workers at the beginning and end of a WSS line,
there is only one boundary point between workers. However, for
the worker in the middle, there are two boundary points in every
cycle, the locations of which are beyond his or her control.
The analysis supporting the corollary Hypothesis 2C shows the
impact these line position effects can have on group heterogeneity.
Whereas the effects on the heterogeneity of work rates on the WSS
and FAS lines were opposite (WSS increased heterogeneity, al
though FAS decreased it), the net effect on mean group perfor
mance is unclear. Whereas an increase in heterogeneity should be
associated with less blocking on a WSS (because a slower worker
is less likely to catch up to a faster worker when the difference
between them is greater), and a decrease in heterogeneity should
be associated with less starvation on an FAS (because a faster
workers will wait less time for a slower worker when the differ

ence between them is less), our analysis of flow times (see Table
1) did not demonstrate any significant reduction in flow time
compared with the individual work policy. Further work is needed
to examine the significance of any reduction in starvation and
blocking due to the effect of WFP on heterogeneity and whether
that reduction is more significant for one policy than for another.
The analysis supporting Hypothesis 3 that demonstrates that
WFPs have an impact on the variability of individual work rates is
significant for researchers who study flow lines, because it sug
gests that within-cell variance cannot be ignored when making
between-cell comparisons of WFP performance. Although it was
not hypothesized, our data also showed that the middle-of-the-line
positions tend to exhibit more variability than the other line posi
tions under the WSS, perhaps because of the dispersion of atten
tion required to monitor both upstream and downstream assign
ment boundaries. Although some research has examined the
allocation of given levels of individual variability to different line
positions as a part of a WFP (e.g., Lau, 1992), to our knowledge,
our research is the first to suggest that line position itself changes
the magnitude of that variability.
The managerial implication of these changes in variability will
likely depend on the magnitude of the underlying variability. There
exist industrial settings in which CVs are considerably larger than
those found in this laboratory study (Doerr & Arreola-Risa, 2000;
Knott & Sury, 1987). The magnitude of the increase in individual
variability associated with the WSS policy on this data set (a
33%–108% increase in CV, depending on the line position) sug
gests that further investigation should be undertaken to determine
a threshold level of variability at which the statistically significant
individual level effects described in this analysis begin to make a
practical difference in group performance.
In spite of the dearth of operations management models incor
porating within-worker and between-workers variability, firms
seem to be aware of it. Automation, between-workers buffer
inventories, and methods training can all be seen, in part, as
(expensive) ways to ameliorate the “problem” of within-worker
and between-workers variability, whereas a WSS can be seen as an
attempt to exploit between-workers variability rather than to avoid
it. Our results suggest that WSS may not be able to successfully
exploit between-workers differences, because the policy itself in
duces within-worker variability.

Limitations, Extensions, and Summary
This article has examined within-worker and between-workers
differences in performance, factors typically ignored in operations
management models of production lines. There are at least three
reasons why this examination is significant. First, the existence of
within-worker variability that is affected by work flow policy
suggests that statistical analysis of work flow policy interventions
must account for within-cell variability. Second, we have shown
that the effect of within-worker and between-workers variability
on flow line efficiency is moderated by work flow policies. Al
though the existence of such variability was not seriously in
question, few articles have appeared that recognize it, and very
little empirical work demonstrates it. Third, this article represents
an initial step in the investigation of the issue of the practical
significance of the effect of within-worker and between-workers
variability and demonstrates that the significance of the effect may

depend on the work flow policy. Although we believe that the
contribution of this article in each of these three areas is signifi
cant, the article has a number of limitations and needs to be
extended in a number of ways.
A primary limitation is the difficultly in generalizing from
student subjects. However, it is important to note that this limita
tion applies equally to both the WSS and the FAS systems we
examined. Thus, because our main goal was to compare these two
systems, we see no reason why the use of student subjects should
have biased this comparison. In other words, we fully recognize
that the motivation and behavior of full-time workers employed in
production jobs will not be the same as that of students engaged in
a behavioral simulation (however elaborate the simulation). How
ever, this limitation does not directly impact the generalizability of
our results, because our results deal with differences between the
impact of two operating policies on motivation and performance.
Although it may also be true that the differences between the
impact of the policies would not be the same for students as for
workers employed in production jobs, we see no strong argument
as to why this should be so (or how it would bias the results).
Nonetheless, it is clear that laboratory research of the type reported
in this article needs to be cross-validated in the field, on different
sorts of tasks, with longer flow lines, and with other workflow
policies. We point to the need for such cross-validation as an
obvious extension of the current work.
In this article, we have compared balanced (equal workload)
FAS lines with WSS lines that naturally unbalance the workload so
that faster workers receive more work. This is appropriate because,
as we noted, the FAS literature has typically ignored worker
differences in ability in the past. However, differences in average
individual performance have recently been addressed in the FAS
literature. Additional line-balancing algorithms have appeared that
account for differences in average individual performance and
variability (Doerr et al., 2000). These algorithms load faster work
ers more heavily than slower workers, in proportion to their
average performance and variability. Such “imbalanced” lines
outperform balanced lines when worker differences exist (Doerr et
al. 2000). Clearly a comparison between WSS lines and these
“imbalanced” FAS lines is another obvious extension of the
present work.
We also reported line position effects, but because we did not
manipulate line position by assigning one participant to multiple
positions or by randomly assigning positions (so that relative speed
and position interactions could be checked), our ability to make
statements about these effects is limited. Moreover, we examined
only three position lines, which limits our ability to make state
ments, for example, about generalized middle-position effects. We
did not manipulate line position, because we were trying to avoid
a confound with sequence and policy effects—as slow to fast is the
prescribed sequence for WSS, our manipulation provides a clear
comparison on that basis and allows us to examine only dynamic
versus static work assignments. We feel that this was appropriate,
because the focus of our study was not line position effects.
However, interactions between line position and relative speed
need to be examined in future work.
Whereas this article reports on observable behaviors (perfor
mance times), the underlying logic supporting the effects we
observed rests, in part, on psychological variables that we did not
measure (e.g., interdependence, assignment clarity variables).

Thus, although many of our hypotheses were supported, and those
hypotheses are consonant with the psychological explanations we
have discussed, it remains a limitation of this article that some
underlying psychological mechanisms have not been directly in
vestigated. In part, this is due to the lack of an appropriate
measurement scale. Although scales have been developed for
received and initiated interdependence (Kiggundu, 1978, 1981,
1983), and modifications of those scales have been used success
fully in some research (e.g., Stewart & Barrick, 2000), the scales
may not be appropriate for studies of sequential interdependence
or in lab settings. Scale development is also needed for assignment
clarity, which to our knowledge is a new construct, and for
received and initiated interdependence. Such scale development is
a clear direction for future work.
Although our article draws on some of the individual-difference
literature for theoretical support (e.g., Ployhart & Hakel, 1998;
Schmidt & Hunter, 1983), we did not measure any individualdifference psychological constructs (e.g., preference for group
work; Shaw, Duffy, & Stark, 2000), nor did we measure differ
ences in cognitive ability or attempt to correlate our individual
work condition performance measure with any other individualdifference variable. We believe that the relationship between in
dividual performance and measures of, for example, individual
differences in cognitive ability are beyond the scope of the current
article, in which we attempt to assess the interaction between
individual performance and work flow policy on group perfor
mance. However, more investigation is clearly needed into the
relationship between individual-difference variables and the fac
tors examined in this article.
In addition, we held constant obvious external factors, such as
pay, that may differ between policies and have motivational im
plications. Future work is needed to embed the phenomenon we
study in a broader social–psychological context. In doing this, it is
important to note that a cross-level structural model is needed. In
the current research, some of the variables were measured at the
individual level (individual performance and variability) and some
at the group level (group performance and heterogeneity). Like
wise, some of the psychologically related variables will need to be
measured at the group level (e.g., cohesion, the Koehler effect) and
some at the individual level (e.g., social compensation, assignment
clarity, social loafing, and motivation), whereas some should be
measured at multiple levels (e.g., equity and interdependence).
It is difficult to draw managerial implications from a single
experiment, and this is a limitation of any empirical work. How
ever, our results do suggest that firms should be cautious about
expecting dramatic productivity improvements from a WSS im
plementation. The proposition that managers need to consider
within-worker and between-workers variability when selecting an
operating policy such as a WSS warrants further examination.
In summary, we found that contrary to mathematical models of
human performance, work flow policies induce changes in indi
vidual work rates, relative work rates (performance heterogeneity),
and individual variability. Although the impact of work flow
policy on individual work rates has been shown before (Doerr,
Mitchell, Klastorin, & Brown, 1996; Schultz et al., 1998), this has
been in regards to the impact of changes in buffers. To our
knowledge, ours is the first study to investigate the impact of
changes in boundary (static or dynamic) rules and the first to
establish the impact on heterogeneity and individual variability.

Our findings about the impact of WFP on individual differences
in average performance and variability suggest that future research
on flow line policies needs to consider who is on the line (average
performance and variability), where they are on the line (line
position effects), and the impact of WFP on the psychology and
behavior of the group and the individual.
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